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1 Introduction 
Firms in emerging markets often borrow in a foreign rather than the domestic currency. 
Unhedged foreign currency borrowing by the private sector is seen as a major cause of the 
financial crises in East Asia in the 1990’s (Goldstein and Turner 2002). Currently there are 
strong fears that again foreign currency borrowing could jeopardize financial stability, this 
time in Emerging Europe. Such instability could have stark repercussions for the Western 
European banks which dominate lending in many of these countries.  
The risks arising from foreign currency borrowing in countries like Poland, Hungary, 
Romania or Bulgaria are particularly worrying, as these loans are predominantly held by retail 
clients, i.e. households and small firms. “The point to grasp about Eastern Europe is that … 
the debt is plagued by currency mismatches because in recent years households (and to a 
lesser extent, corporates) have increasingly chosen to borrow in low-interest currencies …it 
has shades of the Asian tigers back in 1997.” (Financial Times, 29/9/2007). 
Existing evidence for the region examines the motivation for firms (Brown, Ongena and 
Yesin 2009) and households (Beer, Ongena and Peter 2008) to choose a loan in a foreign 
rather than the local currency. However, the currency denomination of loans depends not only 
on the firms’ preferred currency, but also on the loan menu which banks offer to them. For 
example if the future value of the domestic currency is unpredictable and banks are risk-
averse they may be wary of extending credit, in particular long-term credit, in the local 
currency (Luca and Petrova 2008). But banks’ supply of foreign currency loans may also 
depend on their own access to foreign currency refinancing (Basso, Calvo-Gonzalez and 
Jurgilas 2007). Due to their foreign ownership many banks in Emerging Europe have 
substantial liabilities in euro. Limited by prudential regulations in their currency exposure, 
and limited by weakly developed forward markets in instruments to hedge foreign currency 
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positions, banks may lend in foreign currencies to preventing currency mismatches on their 
own balance sheets (Luca and Petrova 2008, Sorsa, Bakker, Duenwald, Maechler and Tiffin 
2007).  
In this paper we examine how the currency denomination of loans is determined in the 
negotiation process that takes place between small firms and one retail bank in Bulgaria. Our 
analysis is based on information for 105,284 business loans granted to over sixty-thousand 
firms during the period 2003-2007. In contrast to previous studies, we observe not only the 
currency as stated in the loan contract but also the borrower’s requested currency. We are 
therefore able to examine to what extent the currency denomination of loans is determined by 
demand and / or supply side factors and which are the driving factors on either side.  
In Bulgaria, as in other Eastern European countries, foreign currencies and especially the 
euro play an important role for domestic financial transactions. On average, in the region 40% 
of customer deposits are held in foreign currency and 52% of loans are made in foreign 
currencies with the euro being by far the most important currency (see e.g. ECB 2007). 
Bulgaria is representative of this “eurization” of the banking sector with 40% of deposits and 
47% of loans denominated in euro.  
The bank at the heart of our analysis is focused on retail lending making it an interesting 
object of study, since exactly retail clients seem to have been most involved in foreign 
currency transactions throughout Eastern Europe. As with the majority of banks in the region, 
the bank is mainly foreign owned and has therefore substantial foreign currency funding. 
Similar to other retail banks in Bulgaria and the Eastern European region as a whole, loans in 
foreign currency make up a substantial share (27%) of the bank’s portfolio. 
In line with theoretical predictions (see e.g. Cowan 2006), our results show that a firm in 
our sample is more likely to request a loan in foreign currency, (euro) compared to the local 
currency (Bulgarian lev) if interest rates on foreign currency loans are lower, if the firm has 
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foreign currency income, and if it faces lower distress costs in case of default. We also find 
that larger firms, older firms and less opaque firms, i.e. those with a longer relationship with 
the bank relationship are more likely to request a euro loan. We, however, also find that firms 
which need larger loans, long-term loans and loans for investment purposes are more likely to 
request a foreign currency loan. This result seems to be driven by firms anticipating the 
reluctance of the bank to extend large or long-term loans in local currency. Indeed, an analysis 
of panel data for repeat clients of the bank suggests that firms learn over time that larger and 
longer-term loans which are intended for investment purposes are more likely to be granted in 
foreign currency. 
Turning to the bank’s choice of granting foreign currency or local currency loans we find 
that the bank does consider a firm’s currency request when deciding whether to lend in local 
or foreign currency. Beyond the request of the firm, the bank is more likely to grant euro if 
the firm is of lower observable credit risk and less opaque to the bank. However, we also find 
that the bank is hesitant to offer large and long-term loans in local currency and is more likely 
to lend in euro when it has more funding in euro.  
In sum, our results show that foreign currency lending is not only driven by borrowers who 
try to benefit from lower interest rates. We find that the substantial share of foreign currency 
retail loans in Eastern Europe may be partly supply-driven, with banks hesitant to lend long-
term in local currency and eager to match the currency structure of their assets and liabilities. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the existing theoretical and 
empirical literature. Section 3 describes our data while section 4 reports results from 
univariate and multivariate analyses. Section 5 concludes. 
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2 Currency Denomination of Firm Debt: Theory and Evidence 
In this section we review existing theoretical and empirical studies on the currency 
denomination of firm debt, establishing the hypotheses for our empirical analysis and 
clarifying our contribution to the literature. 
 
2.1 Theory 
Starting with firms’ demand for foreign currency loans, Goswami and Shrikande (2001) 
show that firms may use foreign currency debt as hedging instrument for exchange rate 
exposure of their revenue.1 Goswami and Shrikande (2001) assume that the uncovered interest 
rate parity holds,2 and therefore interest rate differentials do not motivate foreign currency 
borrowing in their model. However, a wide body of evidence suggests that this parity does not 
hold for many currencies (see e.g. Froot and Thaler 1990 or Isard 2006). Cowan (2006) and 
Brown, Ongena and Yesin (2009) consider firms’ choices of loan currency in models where 
the cost of foreign currency debt is lower than the cost of local currency debt. Cowan (2006) 
shows that firms will be more likely to choose foreign currency debt the higher the interest 
rate differential, the larger their share of income in foreign currency and the lower their 
distress costs. The incentive to take foreign currency loans is weaker when the volatility of the 
exchange rate is higher, as this increases the default risk on unhedged loans. 
Cowan (2006) assumes that investors or lenders are perfectly informed about the currency 
in which firms earn their income. Firms are consequently charged for the credit risk induced 
by taking an unhedged foreign currency loan. In reality, however, banks may not be able to 
                                                 
1 Economic exposure to foreign currency can also be managed with foreign exchange derivatives. See Brown 
(2001) and Mian (1996) for a broad discussion of corporate hedging instruments. 
2 This means that the differences in the nominal interest rates between currencies are cancelled out by the 
changes in their exchange rate so that the costs of foreign and local currency borrowing are identical. 
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verify the income sources of small, non-incorporated firms which do not keep detailed and 
audited financial records (Berger and Udell 1998). This information asymmetry may be 
particularly pressing in countries with weak corporate governance (Brown, Jappelli and 
Pagano 2008) and for foreign banks which have less knowledge about local firms 
(Detragiache, Tressel and Gupta 2008). Brown, Ongena and Yesin (2009) examine the impact 
of bank-firm information asymmetries on loan currency choice. They show that when lenders 
are imperfectly informed about the currency or level of firm revenue, local currency 
borrowers will be more likely to choose foreign currency loans. The reason is that in a 
pooling “equilibrium” these borrowers are not fully charged for the credit risk involved in 
taking these unhedged loans. 
The above models suggest that banks are risk-neutral intermediaries. However, in countries 
with less developed financial markets, banks (or their shareholders) may not be able to 
completely diversify risks. In particular, if forward markets for foreign exchange are not 
complete banks may behave averse towards exchange rate exposure on their balance sheet. 
Turning to banks’ supply of foreign currency loans, Luca and Petrova (2008) examine a 
model of credit dollarization in which risk-averse banks and firms choose an optimal portfolio 
of foreign currency and local currency loans. In line with other portfolio-choice models of 
foreign currency debt (Ize and Levy-Yeyati 2003) they predict that banks will offer more 
foreign currency loans when the volatility of domestic inflation is high and the volatility of 
the real exchange rate is low. Thus, in countries where the monetary authority has not 
established a credible reputation for pursuing price stability this could imply that banks prefer 
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to make loans in foreign currency. This tendency may be stronger for long-term loans than for 
short-term loans as long-term monetary policy may be particularly unpredictable.3 
Banks are typically limited by prudential regulations in the foreign currency exposure they 
can take. In a country with underdeveloped derivative markets for foreign currency exchange, 
as in Bulgaria, this regulation implies that banks’ supply of loans in foreign currency will be 
partly determined by their liabilities in these currencies. Basso, Calvo-Gonzalez and Jurgilas 
(2007) suggest that banks’ supply of foreign currency loans will depend on their access to 
foreign currency debt through financial markets or from parent-banks abroad. Similarly, Luca 
and Petrova (2008) suggest that increases in banks’ access to foreign currency deposits will 
lead them to offer more foreign currency loans.4  
In summary, existing theory suggests that firms will be more likely to request foreign 
currency loans the larger the share of their income earned in foreign currency and the lower 
their distress costs in the case of default. Firms with local currency earnings may also be more 
likely to request foreign currency loans if the lender is imperfectly informed about their 
income structure. At the macroeconomic level, firms will more likely request foreign currency 
loans if the interest rate differential between local currency and foreign currency credit is high 
and the volatility of the exchange rate is low. 
Lenders should be more willing to offer foreign currency loans when they have increased 
access to foreign currency liabilities in the form of debt or customer deposits. Moreover at the 
macroeconomic level, low credibility of domestic monetary policy may make banks reluctant 
to lend in local currency, especially at longer maturities. 
 
                                                 
3 Note that this argument is not identical to that in the “original sin” literature (Eichengreen and Hausmann 1999, 
Hausmann and Panizza 2003), where it is argued that countries cannot finance themselves long-term in local 
currency because of moral hazard, i.e. they have the possibility to affect the value of their own currency. 
4 For a discussion of deposit dollarization see De Nicolo, Honohan, and Ize (2005). 
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2.2 Empirical evidence 
Several recent studies examine aggregate dollarization of credit in developing and 
transition countries. Most recently, Luca and Petrova (2008) analyze the aggregate share of 
foreign currency loans for 21 transition countries of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet 
Union between 1990 and 2003. They find that the aggregate share of foreign currency loans is 
positively related to aggregate export activity, interest rate differentials, domestic monetary 
volatility and deposit dollarization, while it is negatively related to the volatility of the 
exchange rate. They also find that dollarization is lower in countries with more developed 
foreign exchange markets, and that credit dollarization is affected by prudential regulations 
which stipulate tighter open position limits. 
Basso, Calvo-Gonzalez and Jurgilas (2007) examine aggregate credit dollarization for 24 
transition countries for the period 2000 – 2006. They find in particular that foreign funding of 
banks increases their share of loans in foreign currency. Earlier work by Arteta (2002) on a 
broad sample of low-income countries as well as Barajas and Morales (2003) on Latin 
America confirms the hypothesis that higher exchange rate volatility reduces aggregate credit 
dollarization.  
Existing firm-level studies focus on the currency denomination of debt for large firms, 
using financial statement data. Kedia and Mozumdar (2003) find that large US corporations 
match loan currencies to those of their sales. Keloharju and Niskanen (2001) find that large 
Finnish corporations also match loan and income currencies. Moreover, they find evidence 
that loan denomination is driven by interest rate differentials across currencies. Martinez and 
Werner (2002) and Gelos (2003) show that large Mexican firms which export, and thus earn 
foreign currency income, use foreign currency loans as a natural hedge to economic exposure. 
Benavente, Johnson and Morande (2003) as well as Cowan, Hansen and Herrera (2005) find a 
similar result for Chilean firms. Allayannis, Brown and Klapper (2003) investigate the debt 
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structure of large East-Asian corporations and find that interest rate differentials as well as 
asset type explain the use of foreign currency debt. Cowan (2006) investigating around 500 
corporations in half a dozen Latin American countries arrives at similar results. 
To our knowledge there is only one paper to date which studies loan currency 
denomination using loan-level data. Brown, Ongena and Yesin (2009) examine the currency 
denomination of the most recent loan of 3,105 small firms in 24 transition countries, based on 
responses to the 2005 EBRD Business Environment and Enterprise Performance Survey. At 
the firm level they find strong evidence that the choice of a foreign currency loan is related to 
foreign currency cash flow. In contrast, they find only weak evidence that foreign currency 
borrowing is affected by firm-level distress costs or financial opaqueness. At the 
macroeconomic level the authors find no evidence that interest rate differentials and exchange 
rate volatility explain differences in foreign currency borrowing in their sample. 
Our analysis is based on information from 105,284 loan contracts of a Bulgarian bank to 
small and medium sized business clients over the period 2003-2007. In contrast to existing 
studies, our data allows us to examine to what extent the currency denomination of a loan is 
determined by the clients and / or the bank. As we observe not only the currency 
denomination of the actual loan extended, but also the firms’ currency requests, we are able to 
identify how clients’ demand for foreign currency loans and the bank’s supply of such loans 
are related to firm characteristics, other loan characteristics, macroeconomic conditions and 
the bank’s liability structure. Finally, our dataset allows us to examine the factors that 
influence the bank’s decision to alter a borrower’s currency request gaining insights in the 
bank’s weighing of taking on currency vs. credit risks.  
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3 Data and Methodology 
Our dataset covers all annuity loans, credit lines and overdrafts extended to firms by one 
Bulgarian bank (henceforth called “the Bank”) between April 2003 and September 2007. In 
total the Bank extended 106,091 loans during this period. For each loan disbursed we have 
information on the loan conditions requested by the firm, the actual loan conditions granted, 
as well as firm characteristics at the time of the loan application or disbursement. We exclude 
all observations with missing loan-level or firm-level data leaving us with 105,284 loans to 
61,293 different firms. Our dataset also includes monthly indicators of the refinancing 
structure of the Bank as well as indicators of macroeconomic conditions obtained from the 
Bulgarian National Bank (BNB) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Definitions and 
sources of all variables are provided in Table 1. 
 
[Insert Table 1 here] 
 
The Bank is a nationwide bank which focuses on lending to small and medium enterprises. 
Compared to the aggregate banking system, where only 41% of assets are loans to enterprises, 
70% of the assets at the Bank are enterprise loans. The volume of outstanding enterprise loans 
in foreign currency at the Bank (40%) is similar to that of many retail banks in Central and 
Eastern Europe. As with the majority of banks in Bulgaria and the rest of the region, foreign 
strategic investors hold a controlling share in the Bank.5 
 
                                                 
5 In 2007 82% of bank assets in Bulgaria were in the hands of institutions with majority foreign ownership. In 
Central and Eastern Europe the average share of foreign bank assets in 2007 was 80%. 
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3.1 The Bank’s lending technology and loan portfolio 
At the heart of the Bank’s lending technology is a personnel-intensive analysis of the 
borrower’s debt capacity.6 Loan negotiations for our sample of borrowers generally work as 
follows. When a borrower approaches the Bank, she first of all meets a Client Advisor who 
assesses whether the borrower meets the Bank’s basic requirements. If this is the case, the 
client fills in a loan application form. On this form the client indicates her preferred loan 
amount, maturity and currency as well as the purpose of the loan. The client also has to 
provide information about the firm ownership, other bank relations and the free cash flow 
available for the repayment of the loan. 
In a next step, the Bank’s credit administration prepares information on the borrower’s 
credit history with this Bank and other banks.7 At the same time, the loan officer conducts a 
financial analysis of the firm including a personal visit to the firm to confirm its financial 
situation.  
The loan officer presents the customer’s demand and his suggested loan terms together 
with the information gathered during the financial analysis to the Bank’s credit committee, 
which then makes the final decision on the loan terms granted. Since the borrower’s 
repayment capacity is the core figure in the analysis, loan size (amount and currency) and 
maturity are determined first.  
The setting of interest rates and collateral requirements depends on the loan size. For small 
loans (up to 50,000 EUR) collateral requirements and interest rates are fixed and are not 
negotiated on an individual basis. For medium-sized loans (above 50,000 EUR) interest rates 
and collateral requirements are negotiated individually. Given the different lending 
                                                 
6 To gain insights into the usual loan granting process, we have conducted informal interviews with loan officers 
and training staff from the Bank’s head office. 
7 Enterprise loans in Bulgaria are covered both by the public credit registry and a private credit bureau (see 
www.doingbusiness.org ). 
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technologies applied to small versus medium loans we treat these two loan types separately 
throughout our analysis. 
 
[Insert Table 2 here] 
 
Table 2 provides an overview of the Bank’s lending activities during our observation 
period. Panel A and B display the number and volume of disbursed loans by year. The 
overwhelming number of loans in our sample (98%) are small loans with a volume of less 
than 50,000 EUR. However, considering the volume of lending, medium loans (33%) are of 
sizeable importance in the Bank’s loan portfolio. Panel A shows further that almost two-thirds 
of the Bank’s loans are disbursed to repeat clients, i.e. borrowers who take more than one loan 
during our observation period. The subsample of loans to repeat clients will be important 
throughout our empirical exercise as it allows us to control for unobserved (time independent) 
firm-level characteristics. 
Panel C of Table 2 shows that a substantial share of the Bank’s lending is in foreign 
currency rather than in Bulgarian lev (BGN). Loans denominated in euro (henceforth called 
EUR loans) account for 37% of the loan volume disbursed during our observation period.8 
This share decreased considerably between 2003 and 2007, but even at the end of our 
observation period one-third of the disbursed loan volume was in EUR. Panel C further 
reveals that the share of EUR loans varies substantially by loan size. EUR loans make up a 
limited share of small loans, whereas they dominate medium-sized loans. 
 
[Insert Figure 1 here] 
 
                                                 
8 We focus our analysis on foreign currency loans denominated in euro, since they account for 97.5% of the 
bank’s total foreign currency lending. 
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As we have information on the firms’ requested currency as well as the actual currency of 
the loan granted, we are able to establish when the requested currency coincides with the 
granted currency, and how often the Bank changes the loan currency. Figure 1 shows that the 
requested loan currency and the frequency of currency changes by the Bank depend strongly 
on loan size. Small loans are almost all requested and granted in BGN. Moreover, among 
those firms who request a EUR loan a substantial share are switched to BGN by the bank 
(8.9%).9 Requests for medium loans are equally divided between BGN and EUR. Also, 29% 
of medium loans requested in BGN are actually granted as EUR loans, while only 2% of the 
medium loans requested in EUR are actually granted in BGN.10 Figure 1 shows that firms 
with medium loans are more likely to be switched from BGN to EUR and less likely to be 
switched from EUR to BGN than firms with small loans.11 
Figure 1 also displays the frequencies of requested and granted loans for repeat clients 
comparing their first loans to their later loans. Interestingly, there is more switching from 
BGN to EUR and less switching from EUR to BGN for later loans than for first loans.12  
The patterns displayed in Figures 1 suggest that the currency denomination of loans in our 
sample is not only determined by firms’ requests but also by the Bank’s supply 
considerations. Moreover, whether the Bank grants the requested currency or not seems to 
depend on the requested currency, the size of the loan and the duration of the relationship 
with the firm.  
 
                                                 
9 A pearson chi-square test confirms that the probability of being granted the requested currency is significantly 
lower for firms requesting small loans in EUR compared to BGN (p < 0.001). 
10 A pearson chi-square test confirms that the probability of being granted the requested currency is significantly 
lower for firms requesting medium loans in BGN compared to EUR (p < 0.001). 
11 Pearson chi-square tests confirm that the probability of being granted BGN if you requested BGN currency is 
significantly lower (p < 0.001) and the probability of being granted EUR if you requested EUR currency is 
significantly higher (p < 0.001) for medium versus small loans.  
12 Pearson chi-square tests confirm that the probability of being granted BGN if you requested BGN is 
significantly lower (p < 0.001) and that the probability of being granted EUR if you requested EUR currency is 
significantly higher for later loans versus first loans (p = 0.028). 
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3.2 The firms’ decisions to request EUR loans 
To analyze firms’ requested loan currencies, we examine a model in which the dependent 
variable Pr(EUR requested)i,k,t is the probability that a firm i that is taking a loan k in period t 
requests a EUR loan: 
 
Pr(EUR requested)i,k,t = α + β1Fi,t + β2Lk + β3Mt + εi,k,t     (1) 
 
In this model Fi,t and Lk are vectors of firm characteristics and other requested loan 
characteristics while Mt is a vector of the macroeconomic conditions at the time of loan 
disbursement. 
 
Firm income, distress costs, and transparency 
Firms which have income in foreign currency may use foreign currency debt to hedge the 
economic exposure. They are also less likely to be forced into default by exchange rate 
depreciations and thus more likely to take foreign currency loans. Our proxy for foreign 
currency revenue is the dummy variable EUR account which equals one if the firm has a 
savings or term account in EUR at the disbursement date of the loan, and equals zero 
otherwise. We believe firms with a EUR savings account to be more likely to have income in 
EUR.13 Brown, Ongena and Yesin (2009) argue that firms with higher income to debt-service 
ratios are less likely to be forced into default by exchange rate depreciations and are thus 
more likely to take foreign currency loans. Our indicator of the firm’s available monthly 
income is the variable Disposable income which measures the firm’s monthly free cash flow 
(in log EUR) at loan disbursement.  
                                                 
13 To rule out that the existence of a savings or term account per se affects a firm’s decision, we ran regressions 
including the variable BGN account indicating whether the firm holds a BGN savings or term account at the 
disbursement date of the loan. The results remain qualitatively unaltered. 
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Theory predicts that firms with low distress costs in the case of default are more likely to 
request foreign currency loans (Goswami and Shrikande 2001 and Cowan 2006). We include 
two indictors of firm-level distress costs in our analysis. Our first indicator is Leverage, which 
measures the firm’s total liabilities as a share of its total assets. Being highly levered leads to 
higher distress costs since it is very costly for firms to obtain emergency financing when 
facing default. Firms in which the owner or manager have higher private values of continuing 
their business also face higher distress costs in the case of default (Froot, Scharfstein and 
Stein 1993). We expect this private value to be higher in sole proprietorships than in 
incorporated companies. Our second indicator of distress costs Sole proprietorship therefore 
equals one if the firm is a sole proprietorship and equals zero otherwise. 
We include one direct indicator for the degree of information asymmetry between the firm 
and the Bank. The variable Bank relationship measures the length of the bank-borrower 
relationship in months since their first contact. We expect that the Bank can gain private 
information about the firm’s revenue potential by observing the firm’s past repayment 
behavior or it’s usage of other bank products. Both should be positively correlated with the 
length of a bank relationship. 
 
Firm controls and other requested loan terms 
As larger and older firms are more likely to have export income, less likely to default due 
to a given foreign currency loan and more likely to be financially transparent than smaller and 
younger firms, we include the log of total firm Assets (measured in EUR) as well as firm Age 
(log of age in years) as firm-level control variables.  
Other requested loan terms, such as loan size and loan maturity may affect the firms’ 
currency request in both directions. As argued by Brown, Ongena and Yesin (2009) firms 
with a higher debt-to-income burden are more likely to risk default due to exchange rate 
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changes. Thus firms with larger loans and shorter maturities (and therefore c. p. higher 
installments) may be less likely to borrow in foreign currency. However, the risk of 
experiencing sharp exchange rate fluctuations may be lower for shorter loans, suggesting that 
firms with shorter loans might as well be more likely to borrow in foreign currency. Similarly, 
firms with larger loans might also be more likely to borrow in foreign currency since the 
(absolute) interest rate advantage of borrowing in foreign currency is higher for larger loans. 
To control for these effects we include Requested amount and Requested maturity which 
measure the log of the requested loan amount (measured in EUR) and the log of the requested 
loan maturity (in months) respectively. From the firm’s loan application we further include an 
indicator of the purpose of the loan. The dummy variable Fixed capital loan equals one if the 
purpose of the loan is to finance a tangible fixed capital investment, and equals zero 
otherwise. Since the tangible asset may be liquidated in case of default, distress costs (e.g. the 
volume of required emergency funding) may be lower for these loans. 
To capture all remaining differences in firm characteristics our regressions contain seven 
Industry dummies, which indicate the industry of the firms main activity and 33 Branch 
dummies which capture the location of the branch where the firm applied for the loan.14 In 
particular, the industry and branch dummies control for potential foreign currency earnings 
since foreign currency income is more likely in certain industries (e. g. trade, tourism or 
transport) and locations (trade and tourist centers such as Sofia or Varna).  
 
Macroeconomic conditions 
We expect that firms are more likely to request foreign currency loans if the interest rate 
differential on foreign currency loans is high, expected exchange rate volatility is low and 
domestic inflation volatility is high (Ize and Levy-Yeyati, 2003). In our analysis of firms’ 
                                                 
14 As we do not have information on the location of the firm we use the available information on branch location. 
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currency choices we control for the prevailing monetary conditions at the time of loan 
disbursement15 with three indicators based on data obtained from the Bulgarian National 
Bank and the International Monetary Fund. 
For each month during our observation period we calculate the Interest differential by 
subtracting the (3 month) interbank rate in EUR from the interbank rate in BGN. We use this 
market based measure of interest rate differentials, as it gives us a measure of the “risk-free” 
interest rate advantage on foreign currency funds. We also include an indicator of the 
expected volatility of the BGN/EUR exchange rate. Bulgaria introduced a currency board in 
July 1997 which fixed the exchange rate towards the EUR. This currency board held 
throughout our observation period, so that there was almost no actual exchange rate volatility. 
However, this by no means implies that firms or banks in Bulgaria were confident that a 
depreciation of the Bulgarian lev would not happen. Indeed, Carlson and Valev (2008) reports 
survey evidence suggesting that in 2004 14% of the Bulgarians believed the currency board 
might collapse with a sharp devaluation within the next 12 months. Considering a period of 5 
years more than 25% of respondents expected the currency board to collapse with a sharp 
devaluation. Our measure of expected exchange rate volatility is the dummy variable EU 
announcement which is one for all loans disbursed after the announcement (on 26 September 
2006) that Bulgaria would definitely join the EU in January 2007. As a new accession country 
to the EU, Bulgaria was from that date on committed to joining the euro zone at some future 
date, which may have lowered expected exchange rate volatility.  
We measure Inflation volatility as the variance of monthly changes in the consumer price 
index over the twelve months prior to the month in which the loan was disbursed.  
                                                 
15 The firm’s request for a loan and thus the currency choice is naturally prior to the date of loan disbursement. 
Since the Bank’s loan granting procedure is well established and clear-cut, the time span between loan 
application and disbursement is normally short and macroeconomic conditions should not have changed 
considerably in the meantime.  
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Finally, we expect that the demand for foreign currency loans at the Bank may depend on 
the possibilities of firms getting similar loans at other banks. We control for the firms’ 
possibilities to obtain foreign currency loans from alternative providers with the variable 
Foreign currency loans which measures in each month the share of corporate loans in the 
entire Bulgarian banking system which are denominated in foreign currency. 
 
3.3 The Bank’s decision to grant EUR loans 
Our dependent variable Pr(EUR granted)i,k,t is the probability that the Bank grants a loan k 
to firm i in period t in EUR rather than BGN. In our empirical model the vectors Lk, Fi,t and 
Mt again include firm and loan characteristics as well as indicators of macroeconomic 
conditions, while the vector Bt captures indicators of the Bank’s funding structure at the time 
when a loan is disbursed. 
 
Pr(EUR granted)i,k,t = α + β1Fi,t + β2Lk + β3Mt + β4Bt + εi,k,t    (2) 
 
The Bank’s decision to grant a loan in local or foreign currency will depend on the 
expected credit risk for either type of loan. We use our above mentioned firm-level indicators 
EUR account, Disposable income, Leverage, Sole proprietorship, Bank relationship, Assets, 
and Age, as well as our Industry dummies and Branch dummies to control for observable firm-
level credit risk.  
As described in section 3.1, the Bank’s currency decision is jointly determined with the 
loan amount and loan maturity. To circumvent the endogeneity of the loan currency to the 
granted loan amount and loan maturity we include the exogenous requested loan terms 
(Requested amount, Requested maturity, Fixed capital loan) as explanatory variables in our 
supply regression.  
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The Bank’s currency decision should further depend on the mark-up it can earn by lending 
in either currency. We therefore include the variable Spread differential which measures the 
difference between the intermediation spread in EUR and BGN. The (risk-free) 
intermediation spreads are calculated as the interbank rate minus the household term deposit 
rates in BGN or EUR respectively. Luca and Petrova (2008) suggest that banks will offer 
more foreign currency loans when the volatility of the real exchange rate is low and the 
volatility of domestic inflation is high. To capture this we include the variables EU 
announcement and Inflation volatility. We also include the variable Foreign currency loans 
which measures the competition the Bank faces in the foreign currency loan market. 
Basso, Calvo-Gonzalez and Jurgilas (2007) suggest that banks with increased access to 
foreign currency funds may offer more foreign currency loans. We therefore include the 
variable EUR liabilities / Total liabilities which measures the Bank’s liabilities denominated 
in EUR as a share of its total liabilities. Empirical evidence for transition countries further 
suggests that customer deposits in foreign currency may have a stronger impact on credit 
“dollarization” than foreign currency debt sourced from financial institutions or capital 
markets (Luca and Petrova, 2008). To control for this potential composition effect of the 
Bank’s foreign currency liabilities, we introduce EUR debt / EUR liabilities which measures 
the Bank’s debt denominated in EUR as a share of its total EUR liabilities. Both indicators of 
the Bank’s funding structure are calculated using balance sheet information from the month 
prior to a loan disbursement. 
 
3.4 Summary statistics 
Table 3 provides summary statistics for our explanatory variables. Firm- and loan-level 
variables are presented in Panel A, while our indicators of macroeconomic conditions and 
bank funding are presented in Panel B. Panel C displays pairwise correlations.  
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Panel A confirms that the loans in our sample can be characterized as retail loans to small 
and medium enterprises: The firms in our sample are predominantly sole proprietorships, with 
mean assets of less than 60,000 EUR and an average age of less than ten years. The loans they 
receive are on average smaller than 10,000 EUR, with no loan in the sample exceeding 1 
million EUR. The average loan maturity is less than three years, while the maximum maturity 
is twelve years.  
 
[Insert Table 3 here] 
 
Panel B of Table 3 presents summary statistics for macroeconomic conditions and the 
Bank’s liabilities by year. The Interest differential was positive throughout our observation 
period confirming that firms did have a cost-incentive to demand EUR loans.16 The Spread 
differential between EUR and BGN funds was moderate during our observation period, and in 
2004 and 2005 even negative, suggesting that the profitability of both loan currencies for 
banks was similar. Inflation volatility declined during our observation period, suggesting that 
foreign currency loans may have become less attractive. Nevertheless, the share of Foreign 
currency loans in the whole banking system increased slightly during the sample period. 
The Bank’s funding in foreign currency (EUR liabilities / Total liabilities) increased 
sharply between 2003 and 2004, and then remained relatively constant during the remainder 
of our observation period. The composition of the Bank’s foreign currency refinancing 
changed substantially over the sample period. In 2003 79% of its EUR liabilities was debt 
sourced from other banks, International Financial Institutions or the capital market. In 2007, 
in contrast, customer deposits accounted for the majority of the Bank’s EUR liabilities. 
                                                 
16 While these interest rate differentials are based on short-term interbank rates, they do suggest that the interest 
rate advantage on foreign currency funds is smaller in Bulgaria during our observation period than in other 
transition countries (see e.g. Brown, Ongena and Yesin 2009). 
 20
4 Results 
4.1 Univariate tests 
The characteristics of those firms which request local currency loans differ strongly from 
those which request foreign currency loans. Columns (1) and (2) of Table 4 display sample 
means by requested currency, while column (3) displays results of difference tests between 
the two sub-samples for each variable. The table supports the hypothesis that firms which 
request foreign currency loans are more likely to have foreign currency income (EUR 
account) and have lower distress costs (not Sole proprietorship). We also find that firms 
which request EUR loans have higher income (Disposable income), are more transparent 
towards the bank (Bank relationship), and are larger (Assets) and older (Age).  
Firms which request EUR loans also differ from firms which request BGN loans 
concerning other loan terms. They request larger loans (Requested amount), longer-term loans 
(Requested maturity) and are more likely to use the loan for investment purposes (Fixed 
capital loan). These findings contradict our prediction that firms with lower debt-service 
burdens will choose foreign currency loans, and suggest rather that absolute interest rate 
advantages or the anticipation of the Bank’s reluctance to provide larger and long-term loans 
in local currency may be driving currency requests.  
At the macroeconomic level we find that firms are more likely to request EUR loans in 
periods when the Interest differential is higher. Surprisingly, we find that firms are less likely 
to request EUR loans after the EU announcement, suggesting that this announcement may 
have not only reduced expected exchange rate volatility, but also increased the credibility of 
future domestic monetary policy. Not surprisingly, we find that the Bank’s liability structure 
(EUR liabilities / Total liabilities, EUR debt / EUR liabilities) has little impact on the firms’ 
currency requests.  
 
 21
 [Insert Table 4 here] 
 
In Table 4 we also report univariate tests comparing those firms who were granted foreign 
currency loans to those who were granted BGN loans. Columns (3-6) present statistics and 
tests for loans requested in BGN, while columns (7-9) present statistics and tests for loans 
requested in EUR.  
From columns (4-6) we see that the Bank’s decision to alter the loan currency from BGN 
to EUR seems to be correlated with lower observable credit risk and greater financial 
transparency of the firm (EUR account, Disposable income, Bank relationship, Assets, Age). 
However, we also see that in those instances where the Bank altered the currency to EUR, the 
requested loan amount and maturity are higher than in the those cases where BGN was 
granted. While the first observation (larger requested amount) may be in line with the firms’ 
objective of achieving greater (absolute) interest savings, the longer maturity for loans 
switched to EUR suggests that the Bank may be shifting exchange rate risk to its clients.  
Comparing the macroeconomic conditions and bank-funding at the time when loans are 
disbursed, we find that the bank is more likely to switch a loan from BGN to EUR after the 
EU announcement and when the Spread differential, i.e. its earnings on intermediating EUR 
funds, is higher. Moreover, while the share of EUR liabilities at the bank appears similar for 
the switched and non-switched firms, we find that the Bank is more likely to switch a firm in 
periods where it has less debt financing and more customer financing in EUR (EUR debt / 
EUR liabilities). 
For firms which request EUR, columns (7-9) of Table 4 show that firms which are 
switched to BGN can be characterized by higher credit risk and lower financial transparency. 
These firms are smaller, have less disposable income, are more often sole proprietorships and 
have shorter relationships with the Bank than firms who requested and received EUR. 
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Confirming our findings above, in cases where the Bank alters loan currency from EUR to 
BGN the requested loan size is smaller and the requested maturity is shorter. 
 
4.2 Multivariate regressions: Firms’ currency requests 
Table 5 displays our regression results for firms’ decisions to request foreign currency 
(EUR) rather than local currency (BGN) loans based on estimations for both the full sample 
and the panel of repeat clients. All estimations include industry and branch dummies. 
Standard errors are presented in brackets and for regressions with the full sample are adjusted 
for clustering at the industry-branch level. Estimations for repeat clients include firm-level 
random effects to account for unobserved firm heterogeneity.17  
 
[Insert Table 5 here] 
 
Main effects of firm-, loan- and macroeconomic variables 
Column (1) of Table 5 presents marginal effects from a logit estimation for the full sample. 
The results confirm our main hypotheses: firms are more likely to request EUR loans if the 
interest rate advantage on EUR loans is higher, if they have foreign income, and if they have 
lower distress costs.  
The request for a foreign currency loan is positively related to our indicator of foreign 
currency revenue, EUR account. Also, the impact of firm-level distress costs is in line with 
theoretical predictions. Firms with higher potential distress cost (higher Leverage, Sole 
proprietorship) are less likely to demand EUR loans. Further supporting this result we find 
                                                 
17 For the subsample of repeat clients we drop Age as it increases parallel to Duration over a sequence of several 
loans. 
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that larger firms (higher Assets) and firms with tangible assets (Fixed capital loan) are more 
likely to demand foreign currency loans.  
Contrary to our expectations, firms with higher debt-service to income ratios (lower 
Disposable income and higher Requested amount) are more likely to demand foreign currency 
loans. An explanation for this result could be that firms with lower disposable incomes are 
less able to afford the higher interest rates on local currency loans, and that the absolute 
interest rate savings from borrowing in foreign currency increases with loan size. 
Our results do not support the conjecture that opaqueness in the bank-firm relationship 
may encourage (local currency earning) firms to request foreign currency loans. The 
significantly positive coefficient of Bank relationship suggests that more transparent firms (to 
the Bank) are more likely to request a foreign currency loan. This finding confirms the results 
of Brown, Ongena and Yesin (2009) and may be explained by firms’ anticipation that banks 
may only offer foreign currency loans to firms they know well. 
We find that firms with a longer Requested maturity are more likely to request foreign 
currency loans. This result is surprising, given that the risk of adverse exchange-rate 
movements is likely to be higher in the long run. One explanation for this finding is that firms 
anticipate that the Bank may be reluctant to offer long-term loans in local currency. 
At the macroeconomic level we find that firms are more likely to request EUR loans when 
the Interest rate differential is higher and domestic Inflation volatility is higher. In contrast, 
we do not find that lower expected exchange rate volatility as measured by EU announcement 
increases foreign currency loan demand. This result may be driven by the fact that the 
announcement to join the EU also stabilizes expectations about domestic monetary policy. 
The possibility to get Foreign currency loans from other financial institutions does not affect 
the currency requests at this Bank. 
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Small loans versus medium loans 
Our descriptive statistics in Figure 1 show that small loans make up the overwhelming 
share of loans in our sample (98%) and are much less likely to be requested in foreign 
currency (2.9%) than medium loans (54.2%). As discussed in section 3.1, small loans from 
the Bank are standardized products with fixed loan conditions (interest rate, collateral 
conditions). Thus, the low frequency of foreign currency demand among small loans may not 
only be driven by firm characteristics, but also by the expectations of entrepreneurs that they 
do not meet the banks fixed criteria for such loans. As a result, the full-sample results 
presented in column (1) may be dominated by the large number of small loans, for which firm 
characteristics, other loan terms and macroeconomic conditions may have less influence on 
requested currency. 
Columns (2) and (3) of Table 5 examine whether the determinants of requested loan 
currency differ for small versus medium loans. The two columns present estimates from a 
single OLS estimation, with main effects of all explanatory variables reported in column (2) 
and interaction terms with Medium loan reported in column (3). The main effects displayed in 
column (2) suggest that the majority of our full-sample results hold also for the sub-sample of 
small loans. The main effects for our indicators of firm income, distress costs and 
transparency show mostly the same signs and significance as in column (1). This also applies 
to our indicators of requested loan terms and macroeconomic conditions.  
While our qualitative results hold for both small and medium loans, the impact of several 
firm and loan characteristics is stronger for medium loans. The interaction terms with Medium 
loan displayed in column (3) suggest that the effects of firm transparency, size and income 
(Bank relationship, Assets, Disposable income) as well as other requested loan terms 
(Requested amount, Requested maturity, Fixed capital loan) are significantly stronger for 
medium than for small loans. On the other hand, the effects of foreign currency income (EUR 
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account), firm Leverage or macroeconomic conditions do not seem to differ between the two 
sub-samples. We conclude that while our quantitative results vary for several explanatory 
variables, our qualitative results from the full-sample regressions seem to be robust. 
 
First loans versus later loans of repeat clients 
Firms’ anticipations about the willingness of the Bank to provide foreign or local currency 
loans may influence their requested loan currency. This raises doubts about whether our data 
allows us really to analyze the firm’s “pure” demand for foreign currency loans at all. Our full 
sample results in columns (1) actually suggest that the loan currency request by firms may be 
partly driven by their anticipation of the Bank’s behavior: This may explain why more 
transparent firms and firms with longer requested maturity are more likely to request foreign 
currency loans.  
In Table 5 we examine to what extent “anticipation effects” may be driving the requested 
loan currency of firms. We conjecture that anticipation effects should be stronger if the firm is 
actually familiar with the Bank’s loan supply behavior. If this is the case we should see 
differences in the determinants of requested loan currency for the first loan of a firm 
compared to its later loans with the Bank. In columns (4) and (5) we examine whether the 
determinants of requested loan currency differ between first loans and later loans for our 
panel of repeat clients. The two columns present estimates from a single OLS estimation, with 
the main effects of all explanatory variables reported in column (4) and interaction terms with 
Later loan reported in column (5). 
The interaction terms in column (5) suggest that the anticipation effect may affect our 
results for loan characteristics but not for firm characteristics. The interaction terms of Later 
loan with Requested amount, Requested maturity and Fixed capital loan are all positive 
suggesting that firms learn over time that larger loans with a longer maturity and for 
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investment purposes are more likely to be granted in foreign currency. In contrast, besides a 
stronger effect for firm size, there are no significant differences in the firm-level determinants 
of requested loan currency between first and later loans.  
 
4.3 Multivariate regressions: The Bank’s loan currency decision 
Tables 6 displays our results for the Bank’s currency decision with Panel A reporting 
results for all loans, while Panel B reports results for medium loans only.  
As illustrated in Figure 1 above, we observe the Bank’s currency decision both for those 
loans which were requested in foreign currency (EUR) and for those which were requested in 
local currency (BGN). We can therefore first examine the Bank’s currency choice conditional 
on the firms’ requested currency: Among those firms which request EUR, which are more 
likely to receive EUR? And: Among those firms which request BGN, which are more likely 
to be switched to EUR? Secondly, as we observe the Bank’s currency decision for both 
subsets of currency requests, our data allows us, without having to resort to a selection model, 
to examine the Bank’s currency choice for any firm in our sample. Among all firms in our 
sample, which are more likely to be granted EUR, and does this decision depend on the 
currency requested by the firm?  
Column (1) of Panel A displays our results for firms which request a loan in foreign 
currency (EUR). We find that for these firms the Bank’s currency decision is related to some 
indicators of observable credit risk: The Bank is more likely to grant a EUR loan to firms 
which are not a Sole proprietorship and which are larger (Assets). Other indicators of low 
credit risk (EUR account, low firm Leverage, Bank relationship) are also positively related to 
the Bank’s decision to offer EUR, but lack precision.  
The size (Requested amount) and purpose of the requested loan (Fixed capital loan) also 
affect the Bank’s currency decision. The fact that investment loans are more likely to be 
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granted in EUR may again be related to lower credit risk. The fact that large loans are more 
likely to be granted in EUR provides support for our conjecture that the Bank may not trust 
domestic monetary policy and is thus reluctant to offer large loans in BGN. 
We find little impact of our macroeconomic indicators or the bank’s funding structure on 
its probability of offering a EUR loan to firms requesting EUR. The Bank’s currency decision 
seems not related to exchange rate volatility, inflation volatility and availability of foreign 
currency loans from competitors. Moreover, contrary to our expectations we find that in 
periods where the intermediation spread on EUR funds is relatively higher, the Bank is less 
likely to offer EUR loans. Finally, while the Bank’s share of funding in foreign currency and 
its share of EUR funding from customers are both positively related to the probability of 
granting a EUR loan, neither of these effects are significant.  
 
[Table 6 here] 
 
Column (2) of Panel A examines the Bank’s currency choice for those firms which request 
a loan in local currency (BGN). We find that all firm-level and loan-level variables (Sole 
proprietorship, Assets, Requested amount, Fixed capital loan) which make the Bank more 
inclined to offer a EUR loan to a firm which requested foreign currency, also make the Bank 
more likely to offer a EUR loan to a firm which requested local currency. In addition, our 
indicators of firm income (EUR account, Disposable income), as well as the Requested 
maturity of the loan which did not have a significant effect for the latter sample do turn up 
significant for the clients who request local currency. These results confirm that the Bank’s 
currency choice is strongly related to the credit risk of the firm. However, they again suggest 
that the Bank is reluctant to offer large and long-term loans in local currency.  
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At the macroeconomic-level the bank’s decision to switch loans from local currency to 
foreign currency seems unrelated to the intermediation spread (Spread differential) but is 
positively related to perceived exchange rate stability (EU announcement). Interestingly, the 
Bank’s share of funding in foreign currency (EUR / Total liabilities) is again positively 
related to the probability of granting a EUR loan, and is more precisely measured in this large 
sample. 
The results displayed in columns (1) and (2) suggest that the Bank’s currency decision 
process is qualitatively similar for firms which request foreign and local currency. In columns 
(3-4) and (5-6) of Panel A we therefore use pooled regressions to examine whether the Bank’s 
currency decision is independent of the firm’s requested currency. Our results suggest that 
this is not the case, but that, in contrast, the Bank’s currency decision is significantly affected 
by the firms’ request. The columns display estimates of pooled OLS regressions including 
loans which were requested in local and foreign currency. Columns (3-4) show results for all 
loans, while columns (5-6) show results from our panel of repeat clients. Main effects of all 
explanatory variables are reported in columns (3) and (5) respectively while interaction terms 
with BGN requested are reported in columns (4) and (6) respectively.  
Our pooled regressions show that, controlling for firm characteristics, loan characteristics, 
the macroeconomic environment and Bank funding, the Bank is less likely to offer a foreign 
currency loan to a firm which actually wanted local currency (BGN requested). Also, we find 
that the importance of firm characteristics, loan characteristics and macroeconomic conditions 
for the Bank’s currency decision differs for firms which request BGN compared to firms 
which request EUR: The interaction terms in columns (4) and (6) suggest that firm leverage, 
firm size, firm-transparency (Bank relationship), loan maturity, loan purpose and loan spreads 
seem less relevant for decisions when local currency is requested, while firm ownership 
seems more important in the decision process. The results in column (6) also suggest that 
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more bank funding in foreign currency does not lead the Bank to increase lending across the 
board; in contrast those firms which request EUR are much more likely to get EUR than firms 
which requested local currency.  
Our results above suggest that the impact of firm characteristics and other requested loan 
terms on the Bank’s currency decision differ for firms which request EUR compared to those 
which request BGN. One explanation for this finding is that, as described in section 3.1, the 
credit analysis of this Bank is first and foremost geared towards analyzing the capability of 
the firm to repay the requested loan. It seems therefore likely that the bank only proposes a 
different currency if some characteristics of the firm (e.g. foreign currency income) or the 
loan request (e.g. maturity) stand out and make it particularly obvious that another currency 
may be better for the firm (or the Bank). An alternative explanation is that the interaction 
terms of our pooled regressions simply capture non-linearities in the effects of our 
explanatory variables. We know from Table 3 and Table 5 that firms which demand EUR 
have fundamentally different characteristics (size, ownership, income) and request different 
loan terms (size, maturity) than firms which request BGN. If the impact of these variables on 
the Bank’s currency decision is non-linear this would be picked up in the interaction terms.  
To check whether non-linearities drive our results in Panel A of Table 6, we repeat our 
analysis of the Bank’s currency decision for the more homogenous sample of medium loans in 
Panel B of the table. The estimates in this Panel B are less precise than those in Panel A due 
to the lower number of observations. However, the results do confirm two main results from 
that panel: First, the Bank’s currency decision does take into account the requested currency 
of the firm. This is captured by the negative coefficient of BGN requested in columns (3) and 
(5). Second, as captured by significant interaction terms in columns (4) and (6), some 
indicators of firm riskiness (Disposable income), requested loan terms (Requested amount, 
Requested maturity, Fixed capital loan) and bank funding (EUR liabilities / Total liabilities) 
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seem to have a differential impact on the Bank’s currency choice, for firms which requested 
local currency compared to those which requested foreign currency. Interestingly though, the 
sign of the differential effects for Requested maturity (in columns 4 and 6), loan purpose 
(Fixed capital loan in columns 4 and 6) and bank funding (EUR liabilities / Total liabilities in 
column 6) are opposite to those found in Panel A. Thus, for this sample of medium-sized 
loans not only a higher requested amount, but a longer requested maturity, and the request for 
an investment loan are particularly strong determinants of whether a request for local currency 
gets switched to foreign currency. In contrast to our Panel A results we also find that, for 
medium loans, more Bank funding in foreign currency leads the Bank to increase its foreign 
currency lending more to firms which request local currency than to firms that request foreign 
currency. 
Summarizing, our results from Table 6 we establish three main results regarding the 
Bank’s currency decision: First, as expected, the Bank considers both the currency request of 
the firm as well as the credit risk associated with lending to the firm when deciding whether 
to lend in local or foreign currency. Second, other requested loan terms such as loan size, 
maturity and loan purpose affect the probability of firms which want foreign currency to 
actually get foreign currency, and they are also particularly relevant for whether firms which 
want local currency get switched to foreign currency. Third, the objective of matching the 
currency structure of its assets and liabilities does affect the Bank’s willingness to grant 
foreign currency loans, not only to those firms which request such loans, but also to those 
which don’t. 
 
4.4 Switching loan currency and credit risk 
Figure 1 shows that nearly one-third of the firms which request a medium loan in local 
currency actually end up with a foreign currency loan. Our results from Table 6, Panel B 
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suggest that this finding is driven not only by the Bank’s analysis of credit risk, but also by its 
reluctance to lend large amounts for longer maturities in local currency, and by matching of 
the currency structure of its assets to that of its liabilities. In Table 7 we examine what this 
implies for the quality of those loans which are switched from local to foreign currency. 
Comparing those EUR loans which were requested in BGN to those which were requested in 
EUR we examine whether the bank consciously takes on greater credit risk by switching the 
currency of loans.  
Unfortunately we do not have precise indicators of the ex-post performance of the loans in 
our sample. However, we can assess the ex-ante credit risk associated with each loan by 
examining the pricing behavior of the bank. If loans which are switched from BGN to EUR 
involve a higher default probability we should find that the bank charges a higher risk 
premium and thus nominal interest rate on these loans than on otherwise identical loans, 
which were requested in EUR. Note that we can conduct this exercise for medium loans only, 
as small loans from the Bank are given at standardized interest rates. 
 
[Table 7 here] 
 
Table 7 examines the pricing of medium loans denominated in EUR, relating the nominal 
interest rate to firm characteristics, actual loan terms (Amount, Maturity, Annuity loan, 
Collateral) and the requested currency (BGN requested). In all specifications we control for 
macroeconomic conditions and bank-funding with time (year-quarter) fixed effects. The 
baseline results reported in column (1) for all clients confirm that the bank does practice risk 
adjusted pricing for the segment of medium loans. Firms which are more likely to have 
foreign income (EUR account), are more transparent (not Sole proprietorship, Bank 
relationship) and are larger (Assets) pay lower interest rates on EUR loans. Firms with larger 
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loans and shorter maturities also pay lower interest rates, while the repayment schedule 
(Annuity loan) and collateralization of the loan do not seem to affect pricing. These findings 
are confirmed by results for the panel of repeat clients in column (3), which control for 
unobserved firm heterogeneity with firm effects.  
We also find that firms with loans which were switched from BGN to EUR pay 
significantly higher interest rates than firms with loans which were requested and granted in 
EUR. The results in columns (1) and (3) suggest that loans with switched currency have on 
average 13-18 basis points higher rates. At first sight, this effect appears small compared to 
the average interest rate of 10.2% for this sub-sample, as well as to the dispersion of interest 
rates for this sample which varied depending on year-quarter between 500 and 600 basis 
points. However, the difference is similar in magnitude to the effect on interest rates of other 
unfavorable firm characteristics such as being a Sole proprietorship or not having a foreign 
currency account (EUR account).  
The pricing of loans which were switched from BGN to EUR suggests that by offering 
these loans in foreign currency the bank may be exposing the firm to higher default risk and 
itself to higher credit risk. However, higher interest rates for switched loans may also be 
explained by market power and bargaining by the bank. During our observation period, 
interest rates on medium loans in BGN are on average 38 basis points higher than interest 
rates on medium loans in EUR. As firms which requested loans in BGN were prepared to pay 
the higher interest rate, the bank may be simply reaping part of the “saved interest expenses” 
for the firm, by charging higher interest on switched loans.  
In columns (2) and (4) of Table 7 we examine whether the higher interest rate on switched 
loans may be explained by market power of the bank rather than higher credit risk. To this 
end, we include not only the main term of BGN requested but also its interaction term with 
the variable Interest differential, which captures the (risk-free) difference in local currency 
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and foreign currency interest rates. If market power alone explains the higher pricing of 
switched loans we should find the main term of BGN requested to be insignificant and the 
interaction term of BGN requested * Interest differential to be significantly positive. The 
results in columns (2) and (4) show, however, exactly the opposite. We find that the main 
effect of BGN requested remains significant and positive while the interaction term BGN 
requested * Interest differential is not significant at all. We conclude therefore that the higher 
relative pricing of loans which are switched from BGN to EUR reflects higher default and 
credit risk rather than bargaining by the Bank. 
 
5 Conclusions 
In this paper we examine the currency denomination of loans extended to small firms by 
one retail bank in Bulgaria. Our analysis is based on credit file data for 105,284 loans over the 
period 2003-2007. In contrast to existing studies, our data allows us to disentangle demand 
and supply side drivers of the currency denomination of loans. We observe not only the actual 
currency denomination of the loan extended, but also the loan currency that was requested by 
the firms in their loan application. We can therefore identify how clients’ demand for foreign 
currency loans and the Bank’s supply of such loans are related to firm characteristics, other 
loan terms, macroeconomic conditions and the Bank’s liability structure. Our results thus 
suggest that foreign currency borrowing in Eastern Europe is at least partly supply-driven, 
with banks hesitant to lend long-term in local currency and eager to match the currency 
structure of their assets and liabilities. 
Our results have implications for policy makers throughout Eastern Europe who have 
recently taken measures to discourage foreign currency borrowing in the retail sector 
(Rosenberg and Tirpak 2008). In Hungary, Poland and Latvia, for example, banks are now 
forced to disclose the exchange rate risks involved in foreign currency borrowing and have 
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had to tighten eligibility criteria for such loans. In Romania and Croatia, on the other hand, 
supervisory authorities have imposed stronger provisioning requirements on foreign currency 
compared to local currency loans. As we find that foreign currency borrowing in Emerging 
Europe seems to be driven by both demand and supply factors, measures that address only 
one of these sides may not be enough to curb foreign currency borrowing. 
Our results also have implications for development practitioners, aiming to foster credit 
access for small firms in developing and emerging economies. Our results suggest that 
providing funds to retail banks in foreign currency may lead these intermediaries to impose 
currency risks on their clients. Recent attempts to create refinancing instruments in local 
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EUR requested Firm requested EUR loan (1=yes, 0=no) Bank
Monetary conditions & the bankinBank granted EUR loan (1=yes, 0=no) Bank
Firm characteristics
EUR  account
Firm holds EUR savings or term account at disbursement date (1=yes, 
0=no) Bank
Disposable income Total disposable income per month at disbursement date (Log EUR) Bank
Leverage Total debt as share of total assets of firm at disbursement date (%) Bank
Sole proprietorship Firm is sole proprietorship at disbursement date (1=yes, 0=no) Bank
Bank relationship
Time since first contact between bank and client at disbursement date 
(Months)
Assets Total assets of firm at disbursement date (Log EUR) Bank
Age Firm age at disbursement date (Log years) Bank
Industry
Industry dummies which are one if firm belongs to one of the following 
sectors:  Construction, Manufacturing, Trade, Transport, Tourism, Other 
services. Baseline industry is Agriculture. 
Bank
Loan application
Requested amount Requested loan amount (Log EUR) Bank
Requested maturity Requested loan maturity (Log months) Bank
Fixed capital loan Loan is for fixed capital financing (1=yes 0=no) Bank
Table 1. Variable definitions and data sources
Sources: IFS: International Financial Statistics of the International Monetary Fund. BNB: Bulgarian 
National Bank.
        , 
Loan granted
Amount Granted loan amount (Log EUR) Bank
Maturity Granted loan maturity (Log months) Bank
Annuity loan Loan is an annuity loan (1=yes, 0=no) vs. credit line or overdraft Bank
Collateral Loan is collateralized (1=yes, 0=no)
Interest rate Interest rate per annum Bank
Later loan Loan is non-initial loan for repeat clients (1=yes, 0=no) Bank
Medium loan Loan amount exceeeds 50'000 euro (1=yes, 0=no) Bank
Branch Branch dummies which equal 1 for the branch which granted the loan Bank
Macroeconomic conditions
Interest differential
Interbank rate BGN (3 month Sofibor) minus interbank rate EUR (3 
month Euribor) (%) BNB
Spread differential Intermeditaion spread ( 3 month interbank rate minus 1 month household 
term deposit rate) in EUR  minus spread in BGN (%)
BNB
Inflation volatility
Variance of monthly changes in the consumer price index over 12 months 
prior to beginning of the quarter in which loan is disbursed (%)
IFS
Foreign currency loans
Share of foreign currency loans to corporations in total banking system 
(%) BNB
Bank funding
EUR liabilities / Total liabilities EUR liabilities as share of bank's total liabilities in month before loan disbursement (% end of month)
Bank
EUR debt / EUR liabilities EUR debt as share of bank's EUR liabilities in month before loan 
disbursement (% end of month)
Bank
Full sample Small loans Medium loans Repeat clients
2003 10,766 10,545 215 7,553
2004 18,621 18,249 372 14,282
2005 23,210 22,673 537 17,738
2006 28,153 27,554 599 18,588
2007 24,540 24,039 501 10,978
Total 105,284 103,060 2,224 69,139
Full sample Small loans Medium loans Repeat clients
2003 69.0 42.8 26.2 48.9
2004 122.9 77.6 45.3 96.1
2005 188.7 121.3 67.4 144.9
Table 2. Loan disbursements
Panel A. Number of loans disbursed
Panel B. Volume of loans disbursed (in million EUR)
This table displays statistics on the bank’s loan portfolio. Results are provided for the full sample and
the following subsamples: Small loans : Loans with amounts up to 50,000 EUR. Medium loans : 
Loans with loan amounts over 50,000 EUR. Repeat clients : Loans disbursed to firms that take out
more than one loan from the bank during the observation period.
2006 221.5 152.1 69.4 161.0
2007 212.0 152.1 59.8 117.1
Total 814.0 546.0 268.0 568.0
Full sample Small loans Medium loans Repeat clients
2003 43.92 23.86 76.77 44.57
2004 42.12 21.09 78.13 41.86
2005 37.65 16.35 76.01 36.94
2006 34.34 15.45 75.78 37.43
2007 33.70 19.01 71.04 42.62
Total 36.93 17.54 75.27 39.75
Panel C. Share of loan volume disbursed in EUR (%)
Small loans
103,060
Requested currency 100,032 BGN EUR 3,028
(97.1%) (2.9%)
Granted currency BGN EUR BGN EUR
98,460 1,572 270 2,758
(98.4%) (1.6%) (8.9%) (91.1%)
Medium loans
2,224
Requested currency 1,018 BGN EUR 1,206
(45.8%) (54.2%)
This figure displays frequencies of requested and granted loan currencies for the following 
subsamples: Small loans  - all loans with  amounts up to 50,000 EUR;  Medium loans - all loans 
with loan amounts over 50,000 EUR; First loans  - first loans of repeat clienst only; Later loans  - all 
loans of repeat clienst except their first loan.
Figure 1. Requested vs. granted loan currency
Granted currency BGN EUR BGN EUR
724 294 26 1,180
(71.1%) (28.9%) (2.2%) (97.8%)
First loans
25,148
Requested currency 24,284 BGN EUR 864
(96.6%) (3.4%)
Granted currency BGN EUR BGN EUR
23,989 295 66 798
(98.8%) (1.2%) (7.6%) (92.4%)
Later loans
43,991
Requested currency 41,680 BGN EUR 2,311
(94.7%) (5.3%)
Granted currency BGN EUR BGN EUR
40,835 845 128 2,183
(98.0%) (2.0%) (5.5%) (94.5%)
N Mean Minimum Maximum
Firm characteristics
EUR account 105,284 0.01 0 1
Disposable income 105,284 852 0 1,154,455
Leverage 105,284 0.15 0 1
Sole proprietorship 105,284 0.90 0 1
Bank relationship 105,284 9.86 0 71
Assets 105,284 57,529 2 12,835,983
Age 105,284 8.45 0 107
Loan application
Requested amount 105,284 8,678 51 1,700,000
Requested maturity 105,284 32 1 240
Fixed capital loan 105,284 1 0 1
Loan granted
Amount 105,284 7,731 61 1,000,000
Maturity 105,284 27.76 1 240
Annuity loan 105,284 0.74 0 1
Table 3. Descriptive statistics
Panel A. Firm- and loan characteristics 
This table reports summary statistics for all explanatory variables. See Table 1 for
definitions and sources of the variables. For all log-transformed variables the statistics
are calculated by using the original values.
Collateral 105,284 0.33 0 1
Interest rate 105,247 14.66 5.75 19.88
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
Macroeconomic conditions
Interest differential 1.57 1.64 1.46 0.68 0.33
EU announcement 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.25 1.00
Inflation volatility 1.50 1.07 0.61 0.99 0.81
Spread differential 0.21 -0.13 -0.14 0.57 0.87
Foreign currency loans 0.55 0.61 0.67 0.64 0.65
Bank funding
EUR liabilities / Total liabilities 0.27 0.43 0.42 0.44 0.37
EUR debt / EUR liabilities 0.79 0.75 0.68 0.64 0.39





































































































Disposable income .00 1.00
Leverage -.01 .09 1.00
Sole proprietorship .01 -.18 -.14 1.00
Bank relationship .08 .07 .17 -.10 1.00
Assets .02 .53 .13 -.35 .14 1.00
Age .01 .02 -.03 .07 .21 .07 1.00
Requested amount .03 .31 .11 -.34 .12 .57 .03 1.00
Requested maturity .01 .00 .10 -.03 .00 .04 -.01 .22 1.00
Fixed capital loan .01 -.04 .00 .03 -.06 -.02 .00 .06 .37 1.00
Amount .03 .32 .11 -.36 .13 .58 .04 .90 .21 .06 1.00
Maturity .02 .01 .12 -.05 .07 .06 .02 .23 .83 .39 .25 1.00
Annuity loan .00 -.04 -.09 .18 -.09 -.09 -.07 -.07 -.11 -.04 -.06 -.10 1.00
Collateral .01 .09 .00 -.19 -.03 .17 .00 .20 -.04 -.01 .22 -.01 .24 1.00
Interest rate -.05 -.15 -.18 .34 -.27 -.31 -.09 -.32 -.30 -.10 -.34 -.34 .40 .25 1.00












































































EU announcement -.74 1.00
Inflation volatility .12 -.13 1.00
Spread differential .93 -.67 -.14 1.00
Foreign currency loans -.30 .21 -.91 -.03 1.00
EUR  / Total liabilities -.11 -.05 -.61 .14 .73 1.00
EUR debt /  liabilities .78 -.86 .44 .64 -.52 -.09 1.00
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Requested currency BGN EUR
Granted currency BGN EUR BGN EUR
Observations 101,050 4,234 99,184 1,866 296 3,928
Firm characteristics
EUR account 0.01 0.02 *** 0.01 0.02 *** 0.02 0.02
Disposable income 690 4,722 *** 649 2,857 *** 2,284 4,905 *
Leverage 0.15 0.22 *** 0.14 0.22 *** 0.19 0.22 ***
Sole proprietorship 0.91 0.46 *** 0.92 0.54 *** 0.65 0.44 ***
Bank relationship 9.56 17.22 *** 9.47 14.20 *** 13.77 17.48 ***
Assets 43,580 390,439 *** 40,197 223,398 *** 193,155 405,268 ***
Age 8.42 9.19 *** 8.41 8.98 *** 8.80 9.22
Loan application
Requested amount 6,323 64,881 *** 5,702 39,310 *** 27,896 67,661 ***
Requested maturity 31.08 50.92 *** 30.64 54.39 *** 39.96 51.75 ***
Fixed capital loan 0.51 0.69 *** 0.50 0.74 *** 0.46 0.70 ***
Macroeconomic conditions
Table 4. Univariate tests
This table reports univariate tests  for our explanatory variables. Columns (1,2,4,5,7,8) report 
subsample means fore each variable. For all log-transformed variables the statistics are calculated by 
using the original values. Columns (3,6,9) report the results of two-sided T-tests. *, **, and *** 
indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. See Table 1 for definitions and 
sources of all variables. 
EURBGN
Interest differential 1.02 1.09 *** 1.02 0.74 *** 0.98 1.10 **
EU announcement 0.31 0.26 *** 0.31 0.59 *** 0.31 0.26 *
Inflation volatility 0.93 0.94 ** 0.93 0.90 *** 0.93 0.94
Spread differential 0.34 0.28 *** 0.33 0.55 *** 0.37 0.27 ***
Foreign currency loans 0.63 0.63 *** 0.63 0.64 *** 0.64 0.63
Bank funding
EUR  / Total liabilities 0.40 0.40 0.40 0.39 *** 0.40 0.40
EUR debt / EUR liabilities 0.63 0.65 *** 0.63 0.55 *** 0.63 0.65 **
(1) (2) (3) (5) (6)
Main effects 
only
Coefficients Main effects Interactions Main effects Interactions
EUR account 0.009*** 0.056*** -0.016 0.057*** -0.02
[0.003] [0.008] [0.074] [0.018] [0.018]
Disposable income -0.001*** -0.005*** -0.032*** -0.004*** -0.001
[0.000] [0.001] [0.010] [0.001] [0.001]
Leverage -0.002*** 0 -0.029 0.004 -0.002
[0.001] [0.004] [0.051] [0.007] [0.007]
Sole proprietorship -0.003*** -0.078*** 0.109*** -0.117*** -0.006
[0.001] [0.006] [0.027] [0.005] [0.005]
Bank relationship 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.002*** 0.001*** 0
[0.000] [0.000] [0.001] [0.000] [0.000]
Assets 0.003*** 0.010*** 0.037*** 0.009*** 0.008***
[0.000] [0.002] [0.009] [0.001] [0.001]
Table 5. Foreign currency loan demand
Including interaction terms 
with Medium loan
Including interaction terms 
with Later loan
All clients Repeat clients
The dependent variable EUR requested equals one if the firm requested a EUR loan and equals
zero otherwise. All explanatory variables are defined in Table 1. Column (1) reports marginal
effects from a logit estimation. All other columns report OLS estimates. Standard errors are
reported in brackets and account for clustering at the branch-industry level. ***, **, * denote
significance at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10-level.
Age 0 0.005*** -0.064***
[0.000] [0.001] [0.021]
Requested amount 0.007*** 0.034*** 0.138*** 0.041*** 0.004*
[0.000] [0.004] [0.016] [0.002] [0.002]
Requested maturity 0.002*** 0.005* 0.058*** 0.006*** 0.019***
[0.000] [0.003] [0.015] [0.002] [0.003]
Fixed capital loan 0.004*** 0.010*** 0.246*** 0.010*** 0.010***
[0.000] [0.002] [0.028] [0.002] [0.003]
Interest differential 0.003*** 0.016*** 0.017 0.010*** 0.011***
[0.000] [0.002] [0.029] [0.003] [0.004]
EU announcement -0.001** -0.004 -0.048 0.005 -0.007
[0.000] [0.003] [0.030] [0.005] [0.006]
Inflation volatility 0.003*** 0.007* -0.007 -0.008 0.006
[0.001] [0.004] [0.062] [0.009] [0.011]
Foreign currency loans -0.01 -0.169*** -0.037 -0.227*** -0.125





Observations 105108 105,284 69,139
Method Logit OLS OLS
R² ( pseudo/adjusted /overall) .455 0.256 0.222
Branch fixed effects yes yes yes
Industry fixed effects yes yes yes
Firm random effects no no yes





Coefficients Main effects Interactions Main effects Interactions
EUR account 0.007 0.003*** 0.009 0.017 0.008 0.006
[0.014] [0.001] [0.023] [0.025] [0.016] [0.017]
Disposable income -0.002 0.000* -0.001 0.001 0.001 0
[0.002] [0.000] [0.003] [0.003] [0.002] [0.002]
Leverage -0.01 0 -0.024 0.028* -0.027** 0.031**
[0.012] [0.000] [0.017] [0.017] [0.013] [0.013]
Sole proprietorship -0.010** -0.001** -0.020*** -0.025*** -0.021*** -0.028***
[0.005] [0.000] [0.007] [0.007] [0.005] [0.006]
Bank relationship 0 0 0.001*** -0.001** 0 0
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Assets 0.018*** 0.001*** 0.030*** -0.026*** 0.028*** -0.023***
[0.003] [0.000] [0.005] [0.005] [0.003] [0.003]
Repeat clients
Table 6. Foreign currency loan supply
Incl. interaction terms with 
BGN requested
Incl. interaction terms with 
BGN requested
The dependent variable EUR granted  equals one if the firm received a EUR loan and equals zero 
otherwise.  All explanatory variables are defined in Table 1. Columns (1) and (2) report marginal effects 
from  logit estimations. Columns (3-4) and (5-6) report OLS estimates from single OLS regressions. 
Standard errors are reported in brackets and account for clustering at the industry-branch level.  ***, **, * 
denote significance at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10-level.
Panel A. Small and medium loans
All clients
Age -0.003 0 -0.005 0.007
[0.003] [0.000] [0.007] [0.007]
Requested amount 0.012*** 0.002*** 0.014*** 0.007 0.006* 0.013***
[0.003] [0.000] [0.005] [0.004] [0.003] [0.003]
Requested maturity 0.005 0.002*** 0.01 -0.001 0.020*** -0.008*
[0.004] [0.000] [0.007] [0.007] [0.004] [0.004]
Fixed capital loan 0.050*** 0.002*** 0.070*** -0.062*** 0.056*** -0.047***
[0.009] [0.000] [0.010] [0.010] [0.006] [0.006]
Spread differential -0.032*** 0 -0.047*** 0.042*** -0.053*** 0.047***
[0.010] [0.000] [0.012] [0.012] [0.009] [0.009]
EU announcement 0.01 0.003*** 0.01 0.006 0.002 0.013
[0.012] [0.001] [0.024] [0.024] [0.012] [0.013]
Inflation volatility 0.01 -0.001** 0.024 -0.039 0.022 -0.033*
[0.016] [0.001] [0.029] [0.029] [0.019] [0.020]
Foreign currency loans -0.221 -0.036*** -0.136 -0.189 -0.374* 0.052
[0.181] [0.005] [0.296] [0.291] [0.193] [0.198]
EUR liabilities / Total liabilities 0.065 0.007*** 0.011 0.008 0.217*** -0.190**
[0.093] [0.002] [0.133] [0.132] [0.074] [0.075]
EUR debt / EUR liabilities -0.013 -0.002 0.024 -0.041 -0.092 0.044
[0.071] [0.002] [0.111] [0.103] [0.058] [0.060]
BGN requested -0.387** -0.589***
[0.195] [0.140]
Observations 4222 101050 105,284 69,139
Method Logit Logit OLS OLS
R² ( pseudo / adjusted / overall ) 0.191 0.408 0.649 0.693
Branch fixed effects yes yes yes yes
Industry fixed effects yes yes yes yes
Firm random effects no no no yes





Coefficients Main effects Interactions Main effects Interactions
EUR account 0.064 0.013 0.043 -0.009 0.023
[0.111] [0.015] [0.068] [0.068] [0.100]
Disposable income -0.001 0.02 -0.005 0.024* -0.005 0.037***
[0.001] [0.019] [0.005] [0.014] [0.010] [0.013]
Leverage -0.004 0.014 -0.037 0.063 -0.055 0.072
[0.005] [0.068] [0.026] [0.055] [0.049] [0.069]
Sole proprietorship 0.002 -0.001 0.007 -0.006 -0.015 -0.003
[0.002] [0.035] [0.009] [0.033] [0.023] [0.033]
Bank relationship 0.000** 0.002** 0.000* 0.001 0.001 0
[0.000] [0.001] [0.000] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001]
Assets 0.001 0.022 0.007 0.01 0.001 0.013
[0.001] [0.021] [0.006] [0.013] [0.012] [0.016]
Age -0.003** -0.03 -0.01 -0.01
[0.002] [0.044] [0.007] [0.038]
Requested amount 0.003* 0.046 0.006 0.046* 0.011 0.013
[0.002] [0.029] [0.009] [0.027] [0.015] [0.024]
Requested maturity -0.002 0.113*** -0.006 0.098*** -0.002 0.107***
[0.002] [0.020] [0.007] [0.020] [0.016] [0.023]
Fixed capital loan 0.080** 0.450*** 0.077*** 0.341*** 0.097*** 0.307***
[0.032] [0.044] [0.019] [0.044] [0.026] [0.038]
S d diff ti l 0 007 0 013 0 025 0 0 041 0 002
Incl. interaction terms with 
BGN requested
Incl. interaction terms with 
BGN requested
Panel B. Medium loans only
All clients Repeat clients
prea  eren a - . - . - . - . - .
[0.006] [0.042] [0.016] [0.039] [0.035] [0.051]
EU announcement -0.004 0.185* -0.017 0.144* -0.048 0.132*
[0.007] [0.111] [0.027] [0.083] [0.046] [0.069]
Inflation volatility -0.006 0.054 -0.015 0.083 0.006 0.016
[0.009] [0.148] [0.035] [0.140] [0.075] [0.111]
Foreign currency loans -0.015 -0.904 -0.174 -0.552 -0.289 -1.535
[0.084] [1.391] [0.278] [1.276] [0.753] [1.138]
EUR liabilities / Total liabilities 0.024 0.605 0.136 0.503 0.177 0.867**
[0.036] [0.576] [0.141] [0.422] [0.285] [0.427]
EUR debt / EUR liabilities -0.009 0.24 -0.063 0.184 -0.217 -0.042
[0.030] [0.481] [0.127] [0.403] [0.220] [0.325]
BGN requested -2.109** -1.179
[0.886] [0.812]
Observations 935 1014 2224 1777
Method Logit Logit OLS OLS
R² ( pseudo / adjusted / overall ) .295 0.331 0.662 0.686
Branch fixed effects yes yes yes yes
Industry fixed effects yes yes yes yes
Firm random effects no no no yes
(1) (2) (3) (4)
EUR account -0.548** -0.542** -0.315 -0.302
[0.210] [0.210] [0.228] [0.228]
Disposable income -0.091*** -0.090*** -0.085** -0.083**
[0.031] [0.031] [0.035] [0.035]
Leverage -0.631*** -0.633*** -0.679*** -0.684***
[0.166] [0.166] [0.173] [0.173]
Sole proprietorship 0.286*** 0.286*** 0.289*** 0.287***
[0.055] [0.055] [0.085] [0.085]
Bank relationship -0.004* -0.004* -0.006** -0.005**
[0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002]
Assets -0.112** -0.112** -0.120*** -0.120***
[0.055] [0.055] [0.040] [0.040]
Age 0.073 0.074
[0.055] [0.055]
Amount -0.322*** -0.323*** -0.268*** -0.270***
Full sample Repeat clients
Table 7. Interest rate on medium  loans in EUR
This table reports estimations for the sample of medium loans in EUR only. The dependent
variable Interest rate is the nominal interest rate charged on the loan at disbursment. All
explanatory variables are defined in Table 1. Standard errors are reported in brackets and
account for clustering at the branch-industry level. ***, **, * denote significance at the
0.01, 0.05 and 0.10-level.
[0.064] [0.065] [0.057] [0.057]
Maturity 0.221*** 0.222*** 0.182*** 0.186***
[0.069] [0.069] [0.056] [0.056]
Annuity loan 0.044 0.047 -0.019 -0.014
[0.191] [0.193] [0.139] [0.139]
Collateral -0.065 -0.071 -0.229 -0.226
[0.157] [0.157] [0.366] [0.366]
BGN requested 0.181*** 0.282** 0.136* 0.266*
[0.061] [0.112] [0.074] [0.137]
BGN requested* Interest differential -0.104 -0.132
[0.092] [0.116]
Constant 17.411*** 17.431*** 17.282*** 17.285***
[0.581] [0.572] [0.930] [0.930]
Observations 1473 1473 1168 1168
Method OLS OLS OLS OLS
R² (adjusted  / overall) 0.45 0.45 0.463 0.463
Branch fixed effects yes yes yes yes
Industry fixed effects yes yes yes yes
Quarter fixed effects yes yes yes yes
Firm random effects no no yes yes
